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Text File | 1993-11-06 | 12KB | 191 lines

Subject:  COLEMAN v. THOMPSON, Syllabus




    NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as
is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is
issued.  The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but
has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the
reader.  See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


Syllabus



COLEMAN v. THOMPSON, WARDEN


certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit

No. 89-7662.  Argued February 25, 1991 -- Decided June 24, 1991

After a Buchanan County jury convicted petitioner Coleman of capital
murder, he was sentenced to death, and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed.
He then filed a habeas corpus action in the County Circuit Court, which,
after a 2-day evidentiary hearing, ruled against him on numerous federal
constitutional claims that he had not raised on direct appeal.  He filed a
notice of appeal with that court 33 days after it entered its final
judgment and subsequently filed a petition for appeal in the Virginia
Supreme Court.  The Commonwealth moved to dismiss the appeal on the sole
ground that the notice of appeal was untimely under the Supreme Court's
Rule 5:9(a), which requires that such a notice be filed within 30 days of
final judgment.  After both parties filed several briefs on the subject of
the dismissal motion and on the merits of Coleman's claims, the Supreme
Court granted the motion "upon consideration [o]f" the filed papers.
Coleman next filed a habeas petition in the Federal District Court,
presenting, inter alia, seven federal constitutional claims he had first
raised in state habeas.  Among other things, the court concluded that, by
virtue of the dismissal of his state habeas appeal, Coleman had
procedurally defaulted the seven claims.  The Court of Appeals affirmed,
rejecting Coleman's argument that the Virginia Supreme Court had not
"clearly and expressly" stated that its decision in state habeas was based
on a procedural default, such that the federal courts could not treat it as
such under Harris v. Reed, 489 U. S. 255.  The court concluded that federal
review of the claims was barred, since the Virginia Supreme Court had met
Harris' "plain statement" requirement by granting a motion to dismiss that
was based solely on procedural grounds, since that decision rested on
independent and adequate state grounds, and since Coleman had not shown
cause to excuse the default.

Held: Coleman's claims presented for the first time in the state habeas
proceeding are not subject to review in federal habeas.  Pp. 3-31.

    (a) Because of comity and federalism concerns and the requirement that
States have the first opportunity to correct their own mistakes, federal
habeas courts generally may not review a state court's denial of a state
prisoner's federal constitutional claim if the state court's de cision
rests on a state procedural default that is independent of the federal
question and adequate to support the prisoner's continued custody.  See, e.
g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 81, 87.  Pp. 3-7.

    (b) Since ambiguous state court decisions can make it difficult for a
federal habeas court to apply the independent and adequate state ground
doctrine, this Court has created a conclusive presumption that there is no
such ground if the decision of the last state court to which the petitioner
presented his federal claims fairly appeared to rest primarily on
resolution of those claims, or to be interwoven with those claims, and did
not "clearly and expressly" rely on an independent and adequate state
ground.  See Harris, supra, at 261, 266; Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1023,
1040-1041.  Pp. 7-10.

    (c) There is no merit to Coleman's contention that the Harris
presumption applies in all cases in which the state habeas court's decision
does not "clearly and expressly" state that it was based on an independent
and adequate state ground.  The holding of Harris, supra, is not changed by
the fact that, in one particular exposition of its rule, id., at 263, the
Court announced the "plain statement" requirement without mentioning the
predicate requirement that the state court's decision must fairly appear to
rest primarily on, or to be interwoven with, federal law.  The Harris
presumption, like all conclusive presumptions, is designed to avoid the
costs of excessive inquiry where a per se rule will achieve the correct
result in almost all cases.  Coleman's proposed rule would greatly and
unacceptably expand the risk of improper federal review in those cases in
which it does not fairly appear that the state court rested its decision
primarily on federal grounds.  Applying Coleman's rule would have very
little benefit to the federal courts in such cases, since their task of
determining the scope of the state court judgment would not be difficult.
On the other hand, that rule would place great burdens on the States,
which, if their courts neglected to provide a clear and express statement
of procedural default, would have to respond to federal habeas review of
the federal claims of prisoners in state custody for independent and
adequate state law reasons, would have to pay the price in terms of the
uncertainty and delay added to the enforcement of their criminal laws, and
would have to retry the petitioner if the federal courts reversed his
conviction.  Coleman's rule would also burden the state courts, which would
have to incorporate "plain statement" language in every state appeal and
every denial of state collateral review that was potentially subject to
federal review.  Pp. 10-14.

    (d) The Harris presumption does not apply in this case.  The Virginia
Supreme Court's dismissal order "fairly appears" to rest primarily on state
law, since it does not mention federal law and granted the Commonwealth's
dismissal motion, which was based solely on Coleman's failure to meet Rule
5:9(a)'s time requirements.  There is no merit to Coleman's argument that
the dismissal was not independent of federal law because the Virginia court
applied its procedural bar only after determining that doing so would not
abridge one of his federal constitutional rights, such that federal review
is permissible under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U. S. 68, 75.  Even if Ake, a
direct review case, applies here, it does Coleman no good because the
Virginia court relied on an independent state procedural ground.  Moreover,
it is clear that the rule of Tharp v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 1, 3, 175 S. E.
2d 277, 278 -- in which the Virginia court announced that it would no
longer allow extensions of time for filing petitions for writs of error
with the Supreme Court unless denial of an extension would abridge a
constitutional right -- was not applied here, where it was Coleman's notice
of appeal in the trial court that was late.  And, although in O'Brien v.
Socony Mobil Oil Co., 207 Va. 707, 709, 152 S. E. 2d 278, 280, the Virginia
court reviewed the merits of a constitutional claim before dismissing the
case on the basis of an untimely civil notice of appeal, it also expressly
declined to announce a rule that there is a constitutional exception to the
notice of appeal time requirement.  While some ambiguity is added to this
case by the fact that the Virginia Supreme Court's dismissal order was
issued "[u]pon consideration" of all the filed papers, including those
discussing the merits of Coleman's federal claims, this Court cannot read
that ambiguity as overriding the Virginia court's explicit grant of a
dismissal motion based solely on state procedural grounds independent of
federal law.  This Court also accepts the Court of Appeals' conclusion that
the procedural bar was adequate to support the judgment, since Coleman did
not petition for certiorari on this question.  Pp. 14-19.

    (e) In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal
claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state
procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the
prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a
result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure
to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.
Cf., e. g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478, 485, 495; Harris, supra, at
495.  Although Coleman would be entitled to relief if the "deliberate
bypass" standard set forth in Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 438-439, still
applied, that standard has been superseded by the Court's subsequent
decisions applying the cause and prejudice standard.  The Fay standard was
based on a conception of federal/state relations that undervalued the
important interest in finality served by state procedural rules, and the
significant harm to the States that results from the failure of federal
courts to respect them.  Cf. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. ---, ---, and,
pp. 19-26.

    (f) Coleman's contention that it was his attorney's error that led to
the late filing of his state habeas appeal cannot demonstrate "cause" under
the foregoing standard.  Carrier, supra, at 488, establishes that attorney
error can be "cause" only if it constitutes ineffective assistance of
counsel violative of the Sixth Amendment.  Because there is no
constitutional right to an attorney in state postconviction proceedings,
see, e. g., Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U. S. 551, a petitioner cannot
claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such
proceedings, see, Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U. S. 586.  Although Coleman
argues that attorney error may be of sufficient magnitude to excuse a
procedural default in federal habeas even though no Sixth Amendment claim
is possible, this argument is inconsistent with the language and logic of
Carrier, supra, at 488, which explicitly says that, in the absence of a
constitutional violation, the petitioner bears the risk in federal habeas
for all attorney errors made in the course of the representation.  Pp.
26-29.

    (g) Nor is there merit to Coleman's contention that, at least as to the
federal ineffective assistance claims that he first presented to the state
habeas trial court, attorney error in his state habeas appeal must
constitute "cause" because, under Virginia law at the time of his trial and
direct appeal, claims of that type could be brought only in state habeas.
Although an indigent criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to an
effective attorney in his "one and only appeal . . . as of right," Douglas
v. California, 372 U. S. 353, 357, 358; Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U. S. 387,
Coleman has had his "one and only appeal" as to the claims in question,
since the County Circuit Court fully addressed and denied those claims.  He
does not have a constitutional right to counsel on appeal from that
determination.  Cf., e. g., Finley, supra, at 556.  Thus, since any
attorney error that lead to the default of those claims cannot constitute
"cause," and since Coleman does not argue in this Court that federal review
of the claims is necessary to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice,
he is barred from bringing the claims in federal habeas.  Pp. 29-31.

895 F. 2d 139, affirmed.

    O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and White, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined.  White, J.,
filed a concurring opinion.  Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Marshall and Stevens, JJ., joined.

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